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Liquidity and ﬁ  nancial contagion
There is an apparent puzzle at the heart of the 2007 credit crisis. The subprime mortgage sector is small 
relative to the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole and the exposure was widely dispersed through securitization. 
Yet the crisis in the credit market has been potent. Traditionally, ﬁ  nancial contagion has been viewed through 
the lens of defaults, where if A has borrowed from B and B has borrowed from C, then the default of A 
impacts B, which then impacts C, etc. However, in a modern market-based ﬁ  nancial system, the channel 
of contagion is through price changes and the measured risks and marked-to-market capital of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. When balance sheets are marked to market, asset price changes show up immediately on 
balance sheets and elicit response from ﬁ  nancial market participants. Even if exposures are dispersed 
widely throughout the ﬁ  nancial system, the potential impact of a shock can be ampliﬁ  ed many-fold through 
market price changes.
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T
he credit crisis of 2007 began with the 
deterioration in the credit quality of subprime 
mortgages in the United States. However, by 
most measures the total size of credit exposures 
could be argued to be small. The ferocity with which 
the crisis has unfolded raises important questions 
on the nature of ﬁ  nancial contagion. The question 
is well posed in a recent speech by William Dudley, 
Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.1
Total outstanding adjustable-rate subprime mortgages 
are less than USD 1 trillion. Moreover, those mortgages 
originated during 2006 and early 2007 represent 
only a fraction of that total. Thus, even if subprime 
delinquency rates keep climbing to unprecedented 
levels, it seems likely that total losses will be roughly 
in a range of USD 100-200 billion. Although this is a 
lot of money, it pales next to the USD 58 trillion of net 
worth of US households or the USD 16 trillion market 
capitalization of the US equity market.
To put these losses in perspective, a 1 percent gain or 
loss in the US stock market –which often occurs on 
a daily basis– is about the same order of magnitude 
of the likely subprime mortgage losses that will be 
gradually realized over the next few years.
So why have these losses –which are the root cause 
of recent market problems– led to so much market 
turbulence?
This is a good question. On the surface, the 
capital of ﬁ   nancial institutions appeared large 
enough to absorb such losses without difﬁ  culty. 
Moreover, securitization had spread the exposures 
across diverse claimholders, minimizing the 
concentration of credit risk in the hands of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries. A widespread opinion before 
the summer of 2007 was that securitization had 
increased the resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system to 
shocks, by spreading the impact of defaults across a 
large number of diverse parties. So for both reasons 
(the small size of exposure and its wide dispersion) 
the conventional wisdom in policy circles up to the 
summer of 2007 was that the subprime exposure 
was too small to lead to widespread problems in 
the ﬁ  nancial system.
Yet, the credit crisis developed with a ferocity that 
appeared to sweep aside these considerations. There 
are important lessons here on the mechanisms of 
ﬁ  nancial contagion.
It is worth drawing out the implicit assumptions 
that may lie behind the presumption that subprime 
exposures did not pose a serious threat to the ﬁ  nancial 
system. The credit crisis of 2007 would, indeed, have 
been a surprise if ﬁ  nancial contagion works primarily 
through defaults. A naive version of such a view could 
be depicted in Chart 1.
Here, bank A has borrowed from bank B, and bank B 
has borrowed from bank C, etc. Then, if A takes a 
hit and defaults, then bank B will suffer a loss. If the 
loss is large enough to wipe out B’s capital, then B 
defaults. Bank C then takes a hit. In turn, if the loss 
is big enough, bank C defaults, etc. We could dub this 
the “domino” model of ﬁ  nancial contagion.
 If the domino model of ﬁ  nancial contagion is the 
relevant one for our world, then defaults on subprime 
mortgages would have had limited impact. This is 
because the exposure to the subprime sector is small 
relative to the total size of the balance sheet, and to the 
capital held by the ﬁ  nancial institutions themselves. 
Any defaults by subprime borrowers could easily be 
absorbed by the total capital of the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
What is more, the widespread use of securitization will 
have further spread the exposures, so that any default 
risk is spread thinly throughout the ﬁ  nancial system. 
There are no weak links in the chain, and therefore 
any shocks would be absorbed through small losses 
spread evenly across many institutions.
The domino model of contagion has been examined in 
many simulation studies conducted at several central 
banks, but the universal conclusion has been that 
1  Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, October 17th 2007. The link to the text of the speech and charts is at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/
speeches/2007/dud071017.html. Subprime exposures are small relative to other measures, too. Total US chartered commercial bank assets are 7.74 trillion dollars 
as of June 2007, while total outstanding mortgages are almost 14 trillion dollars according to the Federal Reserve Board’s ﬂ  ow of funds. Asset-backed security (ABS) 
issuers held 2.8 trillion dollars, commercial banks and savings and credit unions held 4.9 trillion dollars, and Agency and Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) 
backed mortgage pools held 4.1 trillion dollars.
Chart 1
The domino model of contagion
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the impact of the domino model of contagion is very 
small. It is only with implausibly large shocks that the 
simulations generate any meaningful contagion.
However, the domino model is ﬂ  awed. For a start, the 
domino model paints a picture of passive ﬁ  nancial 
institutions who stand by and do nothing as the 
sequence of defaults unfold. In practice, however, 
they will take actions in reaction to unfolding events, 
and in anticipation of impending defaults. Second, 
the domino model does not take sufﬁ  cient account 
of how prices and measured risks change. In the 
simplest scenario of the domino model, asset prices 
are ﬁ  xed at their book values, and balance sheets 
take a hit only with default. Such a view is obsolete 
in the market-based ﬁ  nancial system that we have 
today. Instead, the impact of price changes on 
balance sheets is likely to be much more potent in 
generating distress than outright defaults.
Indeed, defaults need not even be necessary to generate 
contagion. Price changes themselves may be enough. 
Take the episode of the distress suffered by European 
life insurance companies in the summer of 2002. 
By the nature of insurers’ balance sheets, they have 
not borrowed from each other as banks do. However, 
when stock prices plumbed new lows in the summer 
of 2002, the European life insurers found that their 
regulatory constraints were beginning to bind. In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, the usual ‘resilience test’ 
applied to life insurance companies in which the ﬁ  rm 
has to demonstrate solvency in the face of a further 25% 
stock market decline was beginning to bind. German 
and Swiss insurers were even more constrained. The 
remedy for these insurers was to sell stocks, so as to 
reduce their exposures to them. However, large scale 
sales merely served to depress prices further, making 
the constraints bind harder. This generated a further 
round of selling, and so on. The regulators in the 
affected countries suspended the solvency tests for 
several weeks until the crisis abated. For instance, the 
UK Financial Services Authority diluted the resilience 
test so as to preempt the destabilizing forced sales of 
stocks by the major market players.2
The domino model of contagion is ﬂ  awed, and is 
not useful for understanding ﬁ  nancial contagion in 
a modern, market-based ﬁ  nancial system. Instead, 
the key to understanding the events of 2007 is to 
follow the reactions of the ﬁ  nancial institutions 
themselves to price changes, and to shifts in the 
measured risks.
Financial institutions manage their balance sheets 
actively in response to price changes and to changes 
in measured risk. Since market-wide events are 
felt simultaneously by all market participants, the 
reactions to such events are synchronized. If such 
synchronized reactions lead to declines in asset 
prices and higher levels of measured risk, there is 
the potential for a further round of synchronized 
reactions. The key players are the ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries –the broker dealers and commercial 
banks– whose balance sheets are highly leveraged 
and hence whose net worth is most sensitive to price 
changes and shifts in measured risk.
Elsewhere,3 we have shown that ﬁ  nancial  intermediaries 
react in a very different way as compared to households 
to shifts in prices and risk. Households tend not to 
adjust their balance sheets drastically to changes in 
asset prices. In aggregate ﬂ  ow of funds data for the 
household sector in the United States, leverage falls 
when total assets rise (see the paper by Adrian and 
Shin referred below). In other words, for households, 
the change in leverage and change in balance sheet 
size are negatively related. However, for security 
dealers and brokers (including the major investment 
banks), there is a positive relationship between changes 
in leverage and changes in balance sheet size. Far from 
being passive, ﬁ  nancial intermediaries adjust their 
balance sheets actively and do so in such a way that 
leverage is high during booms and low during busts. 
Leverage is procyclical in this sense.
For ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, their models of risk and 
economic capital dictate active management of their 
overall value at risk (VaR) through adjustments of 
their balance sheets. Denote by V the value at risk 
2  FSA Guidance Note 4 (2002): “Resilience test for insurers”. See also FSA Press Release, June 28th 2002, No. FSA/PN/071/2002: “FSA introduces new element to life 
insurers’ resilience tests”.
3  Adrian and Shin (2007): “Liquidity and leverage” working paper, FRB New York and Princeton University, http://www.princeton.edu/~hsshin/working.htmARTICLES
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per dollar of assets held by a bank. In other words, 
the total value at risk of the bank is given by V×A 
where A is total assets. Then, if the bank maintains 
capital K to meet total value at risk, then we have
K= V×A
Hence, leverage L satisﬁ  es
L = A/K = 1/V
Procyclical leverage then translates directly to the 
counter-cyclical nature of value at risk. Measured 
risk is low during booms and high during busts. From 
the point of view of each ﬁ  nancial intermediary, 
decision rules that result in procyclical leverage 
are readily understandable. However, there are 
aggregate consequences of such behavior for the 
ﬁ  nancial system as a whole.
First, consider the behavior of a ﬁ  nancial intermediary 
that manages its balance sheet actively to as to maintain 
a constant leverage ratio of 10. Suppose the initial 
balance sheet is as follows. The ﬁ  nancial intermediary 
holds 100 worth of assets (securities, for simplicity) 
and has funded this holding with debt worth 90.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 100 Equity 10
Debt 90
Assume that the price of debt is approximately 
constant for small changes in total assets. Suppose 
the price of securities increases by 1% to 101.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 101 Equity 11
Debt 90
Leverage then falls to 101/11 = 9.18. If the bank 
targets leverage of 10, then it must take on additional 
debt of D to purchase D worth of securities on the 
asset side so that
assets/equity = (101+D)/11 = 10
The solution is D = 9. The bank takes on additional 
debt worth 9, and with the proceeds purchases 
securities worth 9. Thus, an increase in the price 
of the security of 1 leads to an increased holding 
worth 9. The demand curve is upward-sloping. After 
the purchase, leverage is now back up to 10.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 110 Equity 11
Debt 99
The mechanism works in reverse, on the way 
down. Suppose there is shock to the securities price 
so that the value of security holdings falls to 109. 
On the liabilities side, it is equity that bears the 
burden of adjustment, since the value of debt stays 
approximately constant.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 109 Equity 10
Debt 99
Leverage is now too high (109/10 = 10.9). The bank 
can adjust down its leverage by selling securities 
worth 9, and paying down 9 worth of debt. Thus, 
a fall in the price of securities leads to sales of 
securities. The supply curve is downward-sloping. 
The new balance sheet then looks as follows.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 100 Equity 10
Debt 90
The balance sheet is now back to where it started 
before the price changes. Leverage is back down to 
the target level of 10.
 Leverage targeting entails upward-sloping demands 
and downward-sloping supplies. The perverse nature 
of the demand and supply curves are even stronger 
when the leverage of the ﬁ  nancial intermediary is 
pro-cyclical –that is, when leverage is high during 
booms and low during busts. When the securities price 
goes up, the upward adjustment of leverage entails 
purchases of securities that are even larger than that 
for the case of constant leverage. If, in addition, there 
is the possibility of feedback, then the adjustment of 
leverage and price changes will reinforce each other 
in an ampliﬁ  cation of the ﬁ  nancial cycle.ARTICLES
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If we hypothesize that greater demand for the asset 
tends to put upward pressure on its price (a plausible 
hypothesis, it would seem), then there is the potential 
for a feedback effect in which stronger balance sheets 
feed greater demand for the asset, which in turn 
raises the asset’s price and lead to stronger balance 
sheets. The mechanism works exactly in reverse in 
downturns. If we hypothesize that greater supply 
of the asset tends to put downward pressure on its 
price, then there is the potential for a feedback effect 
in which weaker balance sheets lead to greater sales 
of the asset, which depresses the asset’s price and 
lead to even weaker balance sheets.
A striking portrait of procyclical leverage is given in 
the following ﬁ  gure, which plots the value-weighted 
change in leverage and change in assets for the 
ﬁ  ve major US investment banks4 (Bear Stearns, 
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley 
and Merrill Lynch), plus Citigroup Global Markets 
which reported separately from its parent until 2004 
(1998Q1 – 2004Q4).
Name Sample
Bear Stearns 1997Q1 – 2007Q3
Goldman Sachs 1999Q2 – 2007Q3
Lehman Brothers 1993Q2 – 2007Q3
Merrill Lynch  1991Q1 – 2007Q2
Morgan Stanley 1997Q2 – 2007Q3
Chart 3
US investment banks: asset-weighted growth rates 
of total assets and leverage
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Two features stand out. First, leverage is procyclical. 
Leverage increases when balance sheets expand. 
Conversely, leverage falls when balance sheets 
contract. Thus, leverage tracks the waxing and 
waning of balance sheets in a way that ampliﬁ  es 
the ﬁ  nancial cycle. Although “procyclical leverage” 
is not a term that the banks themselves would use 
in describing how they behave, this is in fact what 
they are doing.
Second, there is a striking contrast between the 
distress in 1998Q4 associated with the LTCM crisis 
and the credit crisis of the summer of 2007. While 
balance sheets contracted sharply in 1998, there has 
not (yet) been a comparable contraction of balance 
sheets in the crisis of 2007. Understanding the 
reasons for the difference between 1998 and 2007 
holds the key to unlocking some of the mysteries 
surrounding the drying up of the interbank credit 
market in the summer of 2007.
To begin with, let us see the aggregate stock of repos 
(both term repos and overnight repos), as well as the 
stock of commercial paper. The commercial paper 
category is itself sub-divided into the asset backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) and ordinary ﬁ  nancial CP. 
The four series are given in the chart below, that 
track the stocks going back to 2001.
4  At the time of writing, we do not have access to the 2007 3rd quarter ﬁ  gures for Merrill Lynch. Otherwise, the list is complete up to 2007Q3.ARTICLES
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It is noticeable how the stock of asset backed 
commercial paper has contracted sharply since late 
June of 2007, even as the overnight repos have not 
seen any diminution. The drop in ABCP stocks is 
even clearer in Chart 5 that gives the growth rates 
of the series.
The drop in ABCP issuance is very sharp indeed 
after the end of June 2007. The red line (ABCP) goes 
off a cliff, so to speak.
The contraction of the ABCP market suggests an 
explanation for why bank balance sheets have not 
(so far) contracted as sharply as they did in 1998. 
The beginnings of the credit problems of 2007 were 
ﬁ  rst manifested by falling prices of securities that are 
associated with the subprime sector. For instance, the 
ABX indices started to fall in June of 2007. The ABX 
indices track the credit default swaps (CDS) associated 
with various rated tranches of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) written on subprime mortgages, 
and are compiled by the London ﬁ  rm Markit.5
The falls in the prices of securities proceeded into July. 
By late July, measured risks increased to uncomfortable 
levels. In particular, the off balance sheet structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits that had been 
set up to buy large quantities of subprime mortgage 
related assets began to experience difﬁ  culties in rolling 
over their asset-backed commercial paper liabilities. 
Many of the conduits and SIVs had been set up with 
back-up liquidity lines from banks, and such liquidity 
lines were beginning to be tapped by the end of July 
and early August.
The tapping of the credit lines were happening at 
precisely the moment that the risk constraints were 
binding harder for the banking sector. Tighter value 
at risk constraints translated to higher shadow value 
of capital and hence to the desired contraction of 
balance sheets. Contracting balance sheets of hedge 
funds and other holders of ABCPs led to a fall in 
the demand for the liabilities issued by SIVs and 
conduits. In late July and early August, SIVs and 
conduits began to experience difﬁ  culties in rolling 
over their short term liabilities.
Furthermore, as credit lines got tapped, the balance 
sheet constraint at the banks began to bind even 
harder, making them even more reluctant to lend. 
In effect, the banks were “lending against their will”. 
The fact that bank balance sheets did not contract is 
indicative of the involuntary expansion of the banks’ 
balance sheets. One of the consequences of such 
involuntary expansion was that they sought for other 
ways to curtail lending. Their natural response was 
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Short-term borrowing of the ﬁ  nancial sector
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up of the interbank credit market can be seen as the 
conjunction of:
￿ Desired contraction of balance sheets
￿ “Involuntary” lending due to the tapping of credit 
lines by distressed entities.
The question is how far the contraction of balance 
sheets have to run in the current crisis. Given the 
recent disclosed losses at the major banks arising 
from the subprime crisis, it would be reasonable to 
conjecture that the contraction of balance sheets still 
has some way to go.
The balance sheet perspective gives new insights into the nature of ﬁ  nancial contagion in the modern, 
market-based ﬁ  nancial system. Aggregate liquidity can be understood as the rate of growth of aggregate 
balance sheets. When ﬁ  nancial intermediaries’ balance sheets are generally strong, their leverage is too low. 
The ﬁ  nancial intermediaries hold surplus capital, and they will attempt to ﬁ  nd ways in which they can employ 
their surplus capital. In a loose analogy with manufacturing ﬁ  rms, we may see the ﬁ  nancial system as having 
“surplus capacity”. For such surplus capacity to be utilized, the intermediaries must expand their balance 
sheets. On the liabilities side, they take on more short-term debt. On the asset side, they search for potential 
borrowers that they can lend to. Aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
search for borrowers. In the subprime mortgage market in the United States we have seen that when balance 
sheets are expanding fast enough, even borrowers that do not have the means to repay are granted credit 
–so intense is the urge to employ surplus capital. The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit 
cycle are thus sown.